Preplea Disclosure of Impeachment Evidence by Gershman, Bennett L.
Pace University
DigitalCommons@Pace
Pace Law Faculty Publications School of Law
2012
Preplea Disclosure of Impeachment Evidence
Bennett L. Gershman
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University, bgershman@law.pace.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bennett L. Gershman, Preplea Disclosure of Impeachment Evidence, 65 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 141 (2012),
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/840/.
Gershman_Ready for PDF.docx (Do Not Delete) 7/26/12 12:09 PM 
 
141 
Preplea Disclosure of Impeachment 
Evidence 
Bennett L. Gershman* 
I.   REJECTING PREPLEA DISCLOSURE OF  
IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE .................................................... 145 
II.   THE ABA’S INTERPRETATION OF MODEL RULE 3.8 .............. 151 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 154 
 
Plea bargaining and guilty pleas are among the most unsavory 
features of U.S. criminal procedure. In this sordid bazaar of 
bargained-for justice, the prosecutor dominates the encounter. The 
prosecutor is authorized to use an array of legally permissible threats 
to coerce a defendant to accept his offer,1 to retaliate against a 
defendant who declines his offer,2 or to engage in deception and 
concealment to force the deal.3 Because they lack knowledge of the 
evidence and the law-enforcement agenda, courts cannot or will not 
meaningfully supervise the plea. And given the much harsher 
consequences of a conviction after trial, a defendant has little choice 
but to accept the offer. Abuses pervade the guilty-plea process, with 
the unsettling consequence that millions more defendants are being 
punished than ever before, often with less justification, and under 
sloppier procedures.4 
It is with respect to the prosecutor’s power to control the 
evidence and to decide how much of it to share with a defendant 
preplea that Professor R. Michael Cassidy aims his critique. In Plea 
Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable Problem of Impeachment 
 
 *  Professor, Pace Law School.  
 1.  See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Miles v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d 1459 
(10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 2.  See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); United States v. Williams, 47 F.3d 
658 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 3.  See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002); People v. Jones, 375 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 
1978). Jones held that a prosecutor was not required to disclose during plea negotiations that a 
key witness had died. Id. at 42; see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION 
FUNCTION § 3-3.9 cmt. (3d ed. 1993) (“This Standard takes no position on this question.”).  
 4.  See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 264 (2011).  
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Disclosures,5 Professor Cassidy deftly explores one of the most 
controversial areas in criminal procedure—the extent to which a 
prosecutor legally and ethically is required to disclose evidence and 
information to a defendant before that defendant pleads guilty. The 
question is far from abstract. As Professor Cassidy observes, given 
several recent cases involving disclosure violations by prosecutors,6 
various organizations have advocated broader pretrial disclosure—
specifically by amending Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure to authorize more extensive and timely pretrial discovery to 
criminal defendants.7 In addition, the ABA’s Standing Committee on 
Ethics and Professional Responsibility recently issued a formal ethics 
opinion purportedly extending a prosecutor’s disclosure obligations 
well beyond the constitutional due process requirements established 
by the Supreme Court.8 
As a former state prosecutor, I recall the issues surrounding 
preplea disclosures in practice. The give and take of the relatively 
informal bargaining process typically focused on how much 
information about the case I was willing to share with defense counsel 
and, of course, the amount of punishment I would be willing to 
recommend to the sentencing judge if the defendant accepted my offer. 
I do not recall ever feeling legally or ethically obligated to disclose to 
defense counsel the strengths and weaknesses of my case prior to the 
plea; whatever disclosures I made were usually for tactical reasons to 
obtain the plea. Some evidentiary information already had been 
disclosed to the defense at the arraignment or shortly thereafter, 
either through statutorily mandated notice requirements,9 bills of 
particulars,10 or statutory discovery.11 More information would be 
disclosed in the event the defendant decided to go to trial.12 
I may have minimized potential weaknesses in my case and 
focused on its strengths, and I am sure the defense attorney made 
 
 5.  64 VAND. L. REV. 1429 (2011).  
 6.  See Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 (2009) (remanding to district court for determination of 
whether withheld evidence would have changed sentencing outcome in capital case); United 
States v. Stevens, No. 08-cr-231 (EGS), 2009 WL 6525926 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2009) (discussing 
prosecutor’s failure to produce evidence in trial of Senator Ted Stevens). 
 7.  See Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1445–52. 
 8.  See id. at 1452–59. 
 9.  See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.70 (McKinney 2011) (electronic surveillance); id. § 
710.30 (defendant’s statements and eyewitness observations). 
 10.  See id. § 200.95. 
 11.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.20. 
 12.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (2006) (requiring disclosure of statements by a prosecution 
witness in federal trials after the witness has testified on direct examination); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. 
LAW § 240.45 (requiring disclosure of prior statements of witness after jury sworn). 
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similar representations. I was acutely aware that the defendant 
suffered some degree of information deficit about potential 
weaknesses in my proof. But it was precisely my awareness of the 
potential vulnerabilities of my case, as well as the time and resources 
I would be required to expend in preparing for trial, that drove my 
plea offer—and, I should add, similar offers in well over ninety percent 
of cases nationwide.13 It seemed clear to me that the defendant wanted 
the plea, was willing to make a solemn declaration of his guilt in open 
court, and was willing to assume the risk that his voluntary 
settlement of the case was a better option than going to trial and being 
found guilty. I did not view the process as fundamentally unfair. 
Professor Cassidy, an expert in prosecutorial ethics,14 does see 
a certain amount of unfairness in this one-sided and unlevel playing 
field, especially with respect to the rules of discovery that greatly limit 
the amount of information a defendant has access to before deciding 
whether to plead guilty. His critique is correct. Criminal discovery is 
one of the most unfair and dysfunctional features of American 
criminal procedure. The absence of significant discovery in criminal 
cases has been a long-standing target of critics who claim that it 
makes a trial a game of “blind man’s bluff,”15 a “sporting event,”16 and 
a virtual “trial by ambush.”17 Indeed, parties in a civil lawsuit for 
nominal damages learn through pretrial discovery almost every fact 
and theory about the other side’s case prior to deciding whether to 
settle or go to trial; with few exceptions, criminal defendants who face 
prison or worse learn very little about the prosecutor’s witnesses, 
 
 13.  See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (stating that ninety-seven percent of 
federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are obtained through guilty 
pleas); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (same); United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 
632 (2002) (noting that plea bargaining occurs in the “vast number—90% or more—of federal 
criminal cases”). It is unclear whether a tension may exist between the Frye/Lafler holdings and 
Ruiz—particularly whether a lawyer who is counseling a client with respect to a plea is required 
under Frye and Lafler to seek out and then advise a client on potential impeachment information 
that could affect the client’s decision to plead guilty, even though a prosecutor has no duty to 
disclose that information to counsel under Ruiz. To be sure, Frye and Lafler are distinguishable 
from Ruiz; Frye dealt with a lawyer’s incompetence in failing to communicate to his client a plea 
offer, and Lafler dealt with a lawyer giving a client bad advice that caused the client to reject a 
plea offer. There is no suggestion that these cases would require a lawyer, in order to perform 
effectively under the Sixth Amendment, to attempt to obtain and divulge impeachment evidence 
to a client contemplating a plea.  
 14.  See R. MICHAEL CASSIDY, PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS (2005). 
 15.  United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).  
 16.  William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 
1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279, 279. 
 17.  United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1969). 
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evidence, and theory of guilt.18 Professor Cassidy carefully documents 
the self-serving legal contortions of officials in the Department of 
Justice to stonewall institutional efforts to amend the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure in extremely modest ways to try to level the 
playing field.19 He also exposes as a toothless irrelevance the ethical 
rules that address a prosecutor’s discovery duties.20 
For half a century, critics have decried the disparity in 
knowledge and resources between prosecution and defense with very 
little success at achieving reform.21 Some prosecutor offices, mostly for 
pragmatic reasons to ensure speedier processing of cases, have made 
their own adjustments to discovery, notably by adopting “open file” 
discovery policies.22 And, as Professor Cassidy points out, some federal 
courts have used their own local court rules to order broader discovery 
than the Federal Rules require, sometimes by enumerating the kinds 
of evidence that prosecutors must disclose pretrial and the timing of 
such disclosures.23 Broadening discovery rules, as Professor Cassidy 
suggests, may be the most important reform to enable a defendant to 
prepare for trial and effectively present his case.  
But a “fair trial” and a “fair plea” are widely different concepts. 
Broadening discovery to ensure a fair trial is a far cry from broadening 
discovery to ensure a “fair plea,” and it is here that Professor Cassidy’s 
critique misfires. The fairness of a trial contemplates a defendant in 
possession of sufficient information to be able to challenge the 
 
 18.  Opponents of expanded discovery often cite the opinion by Chief Judge Arthur 
Vanderbilt in State v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881, 884–85 (N.J. 1953), arguing that expanded discovery 
would facilitate perjured testimony, would lead to bribery and the intimidation of witnesses, and, 
because the privilege against self-incrimination protects defendants from reciprocal discovery, 
would be a one-way street favoring the accused. 
 19.  See Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1445–52. 
 20.  See id. at 1452–59. 
 21.  See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 449–53 
(1991). 
 22.  See Panel Discussion, Criminal Discovery in Practice, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 781, 786 
(1999) (comments of G. Douglas Jones, United States Attorney for the Northern District of 
Alabama) (“We’re taking the approach now that every document that we gather in the course of 
an investigation will be made available to the defense. And it should be made available at the 
time of arraignment.”). But see John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of 
Brady and Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 461 (2001) (“Different prosecutors may offer 
‘open file discovery’ and have vastly different ideas of what it means.”). In Banks v. Dretke, 540 
U.S. 668 (2004), the prosecution represented that it had fully disclosed all relevant information 
that its file contained, but the file did not include critical impeachment information relating to 
one of the State’s key witnesses. In Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999), the prosecutor told 
the defendant’s lawyer that the prosecutor’s files were open and thus there was no need for a 
formal Brady motion, but the prosecution file given to defense counsel did not include several 
previous statements made by one of the prosecution’s key witnesses that would have strongly 
impeached her testimony. 
 23.  See Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1483–84. 
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prosecution’s case. The fairness of a plea typically hinges not on the 
amount of information a defendant possesses, but rather on whether 
the plea is made voluntarily and with the assistance of competent 
counsel to protect the defendant’s interests.24 Moreover, a fair trial 
implicates a host of procedural protections—including rules for 
discovery and disclosure of information to the defendant—that are 
absent from a fair plea, and indeed may be waived by a defendant.25 
Finally, whereas a fair trial involves a forced settlement of a factual 
dispute in a fair adversarial contest before a judge and jury, a fair plea 
typically does not involve a factual dispute, is not considered an 
adversarial proceeding, and involves the functional equivalent of a 
stipulated set of facts. For these reasons, Professor Cassidy’s attempt 
to equate disclosure in these different contexts is a difficult, 
challenging, and problematic undertaking. 
I.    REJECTING PREPLEA DISCLOSURE OF IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE 
Professor Cassidy’s proposal to broaden disclosure of 
impeachment evidence preplea suffers from three major defects. First, 
it is difficult—maybe even impossible—to gauge the value of most 
impeachment evidence prior to a plea, and therefore impeachment 
evidence is a dubious candidate for preplea disclosure. Second, even if 
the materiality of impeachment evidence could be ascertained, 
disclosure probably would not be a significant factor in a defendant’s 
decision to plead guilty. Finally, there are considerable costs involved 
in broadening preplea disclosure of impeachment evidence—costs that 
drain the efficient use of prosecutorial and judicial resources as well 
as threaten the privacy and safety of witnesses. 
As Professor Cassidy explains, there is a significant difference 
between impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence.26 
Exculpatory evidence directly supports innocence. It includes scientific 
evidence excluding the defendant as the perpetrator and proof that a 
third person committed the crime. Impeachment evidence, by contrast, 
may prove innocence indirectly by discrediting a prosecution witness 
who testifies about key elements relating to the defendant’s 
commission of the crime.27 Professor Cassidy focuses on early 
 
 24.  See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 & n.5 (1969) (holding that a guilty plea must 
be voluntary in order to effectively waive rights to trial by jury, to confront accusers, and to avoid 
self-incrimination). 
 25.  See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 625 (2002) (finding that a “fast track” plea 
bargain—in which defendants waive indictment, trial, and appeal—is not unconstitutional).  
 26.  See Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1437–45. 
 27.  To be sure, exculpatory evidence and impeachment evidence are not mutually 
exclusive. Some impeachment evidence may be so compelling as to severely discredit a key 
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disclosure of ordinary impeachment evidence that does not prove the 
defendant’s factual innocence. He comes out in favor of expanding the 
prosecutor’s requirement to disclose impeachment evidence, at least as 
to certain categories of material.28 
Professor Cassidy makes his reform proposals against the 
backdrop of the Supreme Court’s 2002 opinion in United States v. 
Ruiz.29 However, as Professor Cassidy recognizes, mandating preplea 
disclosure of impeachment information through the Constitution is a 
moot point after the unanimous decision in Ruiz, which held that the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments do not require a prosecutor to disclose 
impeachment information prior to a defendant’s guilty plea.30 The 
Court reasoned that impeachment information is relevant to the 
fairness of a trial, not to the voluntariness or fairness of a plea.31 
Moreover, according to the Court, the efficient administration of 
justice would suffer if a prosecutor had to devote more time and 
resources to securing a plea.32 And finally, preplea disclosure might 
endanger the safety of witnesses.33 However, the Court did not decide 
whether a prosecutor may be required to disclose preplea exculpatory 
evidence that supports a claim of factual innocence. Nor did it forbid 
rulemaking authorities from adopting stricter disclosure standards for 
impeachment evidence. 
Unlike Professor Cassidy, and in agreement with the Court’s 
rationales in Ruiz, I do not support a general rule of criminal 
discovery that would mandate extensive preplea discovery—especially 
one that would require disclosure of an array of different types of 
impeachment evidence prior to a defendant’s guilty plea.34 Except in 
 
witness’s testimony linking the defendant to the crime, thereby proving factual innocence. See, 
e.g., Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 629–31 (2012) (ordering new trial where only eyewitness 
previously told police he could not supply a description of the perpetrators, “could not ID 
anyone,” and “would not know them if [he] saw them” (alteration in original)); Kyles v. Whitley, 
514 U.S. 419, 442 (1995) (ordering new trial where key eyewitness gave statement to police that 
was “vastly different” from trial testimony). 
 28.  Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1482–86. Specifically, Professor Cassidy suggests that he 
would require disclosures where a witness fails to identify the defendant in a lineup and where 
the government has given the witness an inducement to testify. Id. at 1482. His approach would 
also require disclosure of “substantial inconsistencies between a witness’s version of events on 
key elements of the government’s proof.” Id. at 1483–84.  
 29.  536 U.S. 622.  
 30.  Id. at 625. 
 31.  Id. at 629. 
 32.  Id. at 632. 
 33.  Id. at 631–32. 
 34.  Professor Cassidy begins his piece by describing serious “flaws” in prosecutors’ 
discovery practices and by citing prominent cases documenting misconduct. However, while 
these flawed practices involved nondisclosures of significant impeachment evidence, the 
nondisclosures occurred in connection with the defendants’ trials and prejudiced the verdicts—
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extreme instances of prosecutorial concealment—such as concealment 
of exculpatory or impeachment evidence that would support a claim of 
factual innocence—and despite the arguments of several distinguished 
commentators to the contrary,35 I am not convinced that significantly 
broadening the disclosure of impeachment evidence during plea 
bargaining is a necessary reform or that it will make much of a 
difference to defendants who are contemplating a plea. Furthermore, I 
do not believe that any incremental benefit in increased disclosure 
would outweigh the added expenditures of time and resources by 
prosecutors and the judicial system. 
Professor Cassidy asserts that impeachment evidence contains 
“limitless elasticity”36 and presents far greater “complexities”37 than 
exculpatory evidence.38 As a result, he believes it is much more 
difficult for a prosecutor to assess the materiality of such evidence 
before trial.39 He also claims that it is easier to assess the materiality 
of exculpatory evidence than the materiality of impeachment 
evidence.40 This assessment is correct. But Professor Cassidy fails to 
 
they did not involve a guilty plea. Moreover, recent efforts by the Department of Justice to 
improve discovery practice—which Professor Cassidy effectively critiques—appear to focus not 
on preplea disclosure but on pretrial disclosure. Finally, the recent ethics opinion by the ABA 
Standing Committee—which Professor Cassidy also effectively critiques—appears to focus more 
on pretrial disclosure of exculpatory evidence than preplea disclosure of impeachment evidence. 
 35.  See Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 
HASTINGS L.J. 957, 959 (1989) (advocating a constitutional, ethical, and statutory mandate to 
disclose Brady material to criminal defendants during plea bargaining); Ellen Yaroshefsky, 
Ethics and Plea Bargaining: What’s Discovery Got to Do With It?, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2008, at 28, 
33, 59 (arguing that “open file” discovery should be expanded and standardized to allow 
defendants access to the government’s evidence). 
 36.  Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1431. 
 37.  Id. at 1441. 
 38.  To be sure, Professor Cassidy’s characterization of impeachment evidence as “elastic” 
and “nuanced” may be entirely accurate. But the same terminology could be used to describe 
many other types of proof, such as circumstantial evidence, opinion evidence, character evidence, 
and hearsay evidence. Moreover, there are instances where “core” or “classic” exculpatory 
evidence could also be characterized as “elastic,” “complex,” “intractable,” and “nuanced.” An 
eyewitness’s account of the crime and the witness’s identification often contain discrepancies 
involving perception, recollection, and retrieval, which, if sufficiently material, can effectively 
undercut that observation.  
 39.  It appears that Professor Cassidy’s discussion is referring to the use of this evidence at 
a trial rather than preplea. He refers to an assessment of this information by a “jury,” the way in 
which the information will affect the witness’s credibility, and how an appellate court will review 
the “trial record.” Id. at 1439–41. 
 40.  Id. at 1439. One of the problems in assessing the materiality of undisclosed evidence 
when a defendant pleads guilty is identifying the appropriate test to be used. In discussing the 
materiality of undisclosed evidence when a defendant pleads guilty, Professor Cassidy asks, 
“[M]aterial as to what? . . . [T]he likely effect of the impeachment evidence on a trial . . . or the 
likely effect . . . on the defendant’s decision to plead guilty?” Id. at 1479. Professor Cassidy does 
not answer this question, although he does refer to other commentary on the subject. Id. at 1479 
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draw the proper conclusion from his analysis—that disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence and ordinary impeachment evidence should be 
treated differently. If one’s focus is on the fairness and accuracy of the 
plea process, it would seem that a prosecutor’s duty to disclose 
ordinary, nonexculpatory impeachment evidence would be far less 
compelling than his duty to disclose exculpatory evidence. Evidence 
that shows a witness may be lying or mistaken usually is more 
attenuated proof of innocence than evidence that would directly 
exonerate a defendant, or (in the familiar constitutional due process 
test) evidence that, if disclosed, would create a reasonable probability 
that the defendant would be acquitted. Impeachment evidence usually 
is uncertain, ambiguous, and contingent. The witness, even if called, 
has not yet testified, and it is difficult to predict how the testimony 
will be developed. Also, prosecutors may more readily discount the 
probative value of impeachment evidence because it may be 
cumulative of other evidence that has already been used to impeach 
the witness.41 
Even assuming a prosecutor can overcome the evaluative 
challenges that impeachment evidence presents, is there any reason to 
believe that disclosure of ordinary impeachment evidence, as distinct 
from disclosure of exculpatory evidence, would make any appreciable 
difference to a defendant contemplating a guilty plea? If a justification 
for preplea disclosure is to provide defendants with adequate 
information,42 cases involving exculpatory evidence offer a far stronger 
justification for preplea disclosure than those involving ordinary 
impeachment evidence.43 It seems to me that the only instance in 
 
n.240. In general, Professor Cassidy is probably correct that it is easier to assess the materiality 
of exculpatory evidence than that of impeachment evidence, yet it is noteworthy that several 
recent Supreme Court decisions involved the nondisclosure of impeachment evidence, the 
materiality of which was not a difficult call. See, e.g., Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630 (2012) 
(holding that withheld evidence impeaching an eyewitness was material); Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 
449, 470–71, 476 (2009) (remanding for further consideration of withheld evidence that could 
impeach witnesses); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 698–703 (2004) (finding material State’s 
withholding of identity of key witness as police informant); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 454 
(1995) (reversing denial of habeas petition where impeachment evidence was withheld). 
 41.  See, e.g., Johns v. Bowersox, 203 F.3d 538, 546 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding no Brady 
violation because suppressed evidence had limited impeachment value); United States v. 
Avelino, 136 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding no reasonable probability that defendant would 
have pled not guilty but for undisclosed impeachment evidence); see also Wetzel v. Lambert, 132 
S. Ct. 1195, 1198 (2012) (noting role of cumulativeness to materiality determination). 
 42.  To be clear, neither Professor Cassidy nor I believe this “accuracy” argument is a 
sufficient reason to require preplea disclosure of impeachment evidence, though other scholars 
have argued to the contrary. See Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1468–76 (describing and refuting the 
“accuracy” argument).   
 43.  See, e.g., Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 868 (2006) (describing note 
withheld by state trooper indicating that victim’s testimony was false and that sexual encounter 
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which disclosure of impeachment evidence preplea would significantly 
influence a defendant’s decision would be in the rare case where such 
evidence supports a claim of factual innocence. 
Professor Cassidy employs several examples to demonstrate 
the elasticity of impeachment information and the potential 
usefulness of such evidence to a defendant’s decision to plead guilty.44 
The examples describe several of the major impeachment 
techniques—a witness’s prior inconsistent statements, impaired 
capacity to observe or remember, and misconduct affecting the 
witness’s character for truthfulness. Some of these examples are 
clearly relevant as potential avenues of impeachment. However, they 
do not appear to me to be of significant value in discrediting the 
witness, and it is unlikely that disclosure of this information would 
realistically affect a defendant’s decision to plead guilty. 
Professor Cassidy’s examples illustrate the intractable nature 
of impeachment evidence. But it is unclear whether any of the 
impeachment information Professor Cassidy posits should be disclosed 
either under discovery rules generally or in connection with a 
prosecutor’s Brady duty.45 He suggests that most conscientious 
prosecutors would view his first example involving a victim’s 
inconsistencies on minor details of her story as requiring disclosure 
under Brady, and he expects widespread disagreement among 
prosecutors on whether the other situations require Brady 
disclosure.46 Even heeding the Supreme Court’s admonition to 
prosecutors to err on the side of transparency,47 I strongly disagree 
 
with victim was consensual); Banks, 540 U.S. at 674 (describing allegation that key witness was 
police informant who provided false testimony); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 441–45 (discussing 
eyewitnesses’ mistaken identification of defendant); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 
n.18 (1976) (discussing police report indicating that fingerprints on murder weapon proved that 
defendant could not have fired fatal shot). 
 44.  Professor Cassidy’s scenarios involve (1) a witness’s alteration over time of “minor 
details” of her story (impeachment by showing that a witness made prior inconsistent 
statements); (2) a case in which one of four eyewitnesses to a crime had been drinking alcohol at 
a party earlier in the evening (impeachment by undermining a witness’s capacity to observe or 
recall an event); (3) an FBI case agent accused of violating bureau policies (impeachment by 
showing a witness’s commission of a prior wrongful act); (4) an eyewitness who has informed the 
prosecutor that she cannot remember where she parked her car (impeachment by showing a 
witness’s deficient memory); and (5) a case in which one of several eyewitnesses to a barroom 
fight advised the prosecutor that she heard that the victim is a “serious pothead” (impeachment 
of the victim’s credibility through a hearsay statement). Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1438–39. 
 45.  See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of 
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is 
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution.”). 
 46.  Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1441. 
 47.  See Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 470 n.15 (2009) (“[T]he prudent prosecutor will err on 
the side of transparency, resolving doubtful questions in favor of disclosure.”); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 
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with Professor Cassidy that many prosecutors would believe that 
there exists a constitutional or ethical duty to make disclosures in any 
of the scenarios he provides.48 The examples represent potentially 
useful impeachment opportunities, but ones of uncertain and 
unknown value. It is unlikely that any of this information would affect 
in any meaningfully way a jury’s assessment of the witness’s 
credibility or that it would, to state the familiar Brady standard, 
create a reasonable probability that with this information a jury would 
acquit the defendant.49 And given the coercive pressures on a 
defendant to plead guilty, it is a stretch to suggest that knowledge of 
this information would influence a defendant’s decision. Moreover, 
even assuming that a prosecutor would be required preplea to disclose 
to the defense impeachment evidence that strongly supports a factual 
claim of innocence, Professor Cassidy’s examples do not represent the 
kinds of impeachment evidence that would support such a claim even 
under the most demanding interpretation of Brady’s disclosure 
standard.50 
Furthermore, the apparent justification for broader preplea 
disclosure—to ensure that the plea is voluntary and accurate—does 
not require disclosure of the above examples of impeachment 
information. Professor Cassidy concedes correctly that disclosure of 
this evidence does not affect the voluntariness of the plea.51 As the 
Supreme Court noted in Ruiz, a defendant’s free will is hardly affected 
 
439 (“[A] prosecutor anxious about tacking too close to the wind will disclose a favorable piece of 
evidence.”). 
 48.  Indeed, it is not clear that any of this evidence would be relevant. For example, it is 
unclear whether a witness’s consumption of a glass of wine at a party affects the witness’s ability 
to perceive; that forgetting where one parked one’s car suggests faulty memory (who hasn’t 
sometimes forgotten where they parked their car?); or that the unsubstantiated accusation 
against an FBI agent would even be considered favorable, let alone admissible, as it does not 
appear to involve dishonesty. Finally, the hearsay statement that the victim is a pothead, 
without more, has very little value. To be sure, as Professor Cassidy notes, these examples do not 
encompass other important categories of impeachment evidence that traditionally are used to 
discredit a witness, such as a witness’s criminal record, mental infirmity, or a motive to lie. 
 49.  See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 421 (interpreting Brady to require a prosecutor to turn over 
evidence where there is a reasonable probability that disclosure would produce a different 
result). 
 50.  It would be interesting to speculate whether, given the recent Supreme Court decisions 
finding that the prosecutor violated Brady by failing to disclose impeachment evidence to a 
defendant who was convicted after trial, these same situations would also violate Brady if the 
defendant had pleaded guilty and the prosecutor obtained a Ruiz waiver from him. See supra 
note 40 (listing recent Brady decisions). These instances all involved blatant and arguably 
intentional prosecutorial misconduct and clearly present much harder Brady questions than 
Professor Cassidy’s impeachment scenarios. To the extent that the undisclosed evidence in the 
Supreme Court cases strongly supports a claim of factual innocence, the Court might very well 
find a due process violation, notwithstanding the waiver. 
 51.  Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1466–67.  
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by the amount of information he possesses.52 In the Miranda context, 
by way of analogy, the voluntariness of a waiver is unaffected by the 
defendant’s ignorance of the subject matter of the interrogation,53 his 
lawyer’s efforts to contact him,54 or the fact that a previously 
unwarned statement may not be used against him.55 Accuracy of the 
plea is a much stronger justification for disclosure, as Professor 
Cassidy notes.56 But it is unreasonable to believe that the disclosure of 
ordinary, nonexculpatory impeachment information—the types of 
impeachment information in Professor Cassidy’s examples—would 
affect in any meaningful way the reliability of a defendant’s open 
acknowledgement of guilt.57 
Finally, as Professor Cassidy recognizes, broadening 
impeachment disclosure preplea would impose significant burdens on 
the efficient use of prosecutorial and judicial resources as well as 
undermine the privacy and safety of witnesses. Prosecutors would be 
required to expend considerable time reviewing case files for 
impeachment information and, in some cases, seeking a court’s 
intervention for orders permitting nondisclosure. This time could be 
used for ongoing investigations and trial preparation. Moreover, early 
disclosure would compromise the privacy and safety of witnesses, 
thereby negating one of the principal benefits of pleas. The costs of 
broadening impeachment disclosure, in short, would seriously 
outweigh the uncertain and often marginal benefits to a defendant 
contemplating a plea. 
II.    THE ABA’S INTERPRETATION OF MODEL RULE 3.8 
Professor Cassidy’s exploration of impeachment evidence in the 
guilty-plea context provides an opportunity to examine a recent 
opinion of the ABA’s Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility that elaborates on a prosecutor’s disclosure duty under 
 
 52.  United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002). 
 53.  See Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574 (1987) (“The Constitution does not require 
that a criminal suspect know and understand every possible consequence of a waiver of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege.”). 
 54.  See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 423 (1986) (holding that the police’s failure to 
inform the defendant of his lawyer’s telephone call was insufficient to “vitiate the validity of a 
waiver”). 
 55.  See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985) (“[A] suspect who has once responded to 
unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and 
confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings.”). 
 56.  Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1468.  
 57.  It should be noted that guilty pleas are permitted even though a defendant protests his 
innocence. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). 
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Model Rule 3.8(d). The ABA opinion requires a prosecutor to disclose 
to the defense all favorable evidence or information, regardless of 
whether the information would be considered material under the 
constitutional Brady standard.58 Professor Cassidy skillfully takes 
apart the bar opinion, whose reasoning he finds “misguided and 
flawed.”59 In examining the history of Rule 3.8(d), he suggests 
convincingly that the materiality concept was retained when the 
ethics rule was promulgated, despite the opinion’s disclaimer.60 
Indeed, the Rule’s phrase “tends to negate guilt” is quite similar to the 
language used in Brady. Professor Cassidy also points out that, under 
the ABA’s new interpretation, a prosecutor may be in violation of the 
ethics rule by not disclosing information preplea even though he may 
be in full compliance with his due process duty under Ruiz—not a 
healthy conflict for a prosecutor.61 Moreover, as Professor Cassidy 
notes, the bar opinion forbids a prosecutor to seek a waiver of access to 
impeachment information from a defendant who pleads guilty.62 
However, this part of the opinion not only is in conflict with Ruiz, 
which unanimously ruled that a prosecutor may seek a waiver, but it 
also finds no support in the text of the rule. And finally, as Professor 
Cassidy notes, the opinion is perverse in one important respect—it 
imposes a disclosure duty on a prosecutor that is narrower than the 
constitutional duty, because it applies only to information of which a 
prosecutor has actual knowledge.63 Contrary to clear Supreme Court 
authority,64 the bar opinion does not require that a prosecutor attempt 
to locate Brady information that other agencies involved in the 
investigation might possess.65 
Although I agree with much of Professor Cassidy’s treatment of 
the ABA opinion, I part company with him in a few places. He 
portrays the opinion as creating a “firestorm” and portending “serious 
battles” or even a “showdown” with prosecutors over disclosure 
practices.66 I am not convinced that Professor Cassidy’s fears are well 
 
 58.  ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 at 1 (2009) 
[hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 09-454]. 
 59.  Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1458. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. at 1455. 
 62.  Id. at 1456. 
 63.  Id. at 1457.  
 64.  See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (“[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty 
to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the 
case, including the police.”). 
 65.  Indeed, I am unaware of any other bar opinion that appears to impose a less 
demanding ethical duty on a lawyer than the duty required by the Constitution or statutes. 
 66.  Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1432, 1453. 
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founded. First, his apprehensions appear to be based on two previous 
ethical “battles”—the government’s efforts to subpoena a defendant’s 
lawyer before a grand jury, in violation of Model Rule 3.8(f), and the 
government’s efforts to contact a defendant without his lawyer’s 
knowledge, in violation of Model Rule 4.2.67 However, these disputes 
concerned a very different ethical issue—they involved actions by the 
government that potentially could destroy the attorney-client 
relationship. These are the kinds of actions that readily invite 
condemnation by the bar. They are quite distinct from the 
government’s long-standing statutory authority to restrict the amount 
of discoverable information to which a defense attorney has access 
prior to trial. 
Moreover, it is not clear that the bar opinion even applies to 
the disclosure of impeachment evidence at all, or that it applies to 
preplea disclosure. The opinion restates the disclosure standard in 
Rule 3.8(d)—evidence or information that “tends to negate guilt”—but 
never defines that standard. The rule suggests, and the opinion 
declares, that the standard imposes a more demanding duty on a 
prosecutor than the constitutional materiality standard, and the 
opinion “explores” the prosecutor’s disclosure duty through a 
hypothetical. However, that hypothetical involves the disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence, not impeachment evidence, and it is used in a 
context that appears to address a pretrial disclosure, not a preplea 
disclosure.68 
In sum, while Professor Cassidy effectively demonstrates 
several weaknesses in the bar opinion’s treatment of a prosecutor’s 
disclosure duty, he may be assuming, incorrectly, that the opinion 
applies to a prosecutor’s disclosure of impeachment evidence. From its 
 
 67.  See id. at 1432 & n.9 (discussing disputes over Model Rules 3.8(f) and 4.2). 
 68.  The opinion posits the hypothetical of a robbery case in which the victim and a 
bystander have identified the defendant from a photo array and a lineup. However, the 
prosecutor has learned that two other eyewitnesses who viewed the same lineup did not identify 
the defendant, as well as that there was a confidential informant who attributed the robbery to 
someone else. ABA Formal Op. 09-454, supra note 58, at 2. The opinion also refers several times 
to the prosecutor’s disclosure of “exculpatory evidence.” Id. at 5. The opinion claims that the 
information in the hypothetical is not necessarily material under the constitutional test but 
would tend to negate guilt under the ethical standard of 3.8(d), regardless of the strength of the 
remaining evidence and even if the prosecutor believes that the evidence is unreliable. Id. The 
opinion further states that there is no de minimis exception to the prosecutor’s disclosure duty, 
which essentially requires a prosecutor to disclose virtually all information that may be viewed 
as favorable to a defendant or that tends to negate guilt. Id. It seems to me that most 
conscientious prosecutors would view the information in the bar opinion hypothetical as required 
to be disclosed under Brady. Moreover, to suggest that a prosecutor is ethically required to 
disclose all favorable information, no matter how minimal, effectively renders the bar opinion the 
functional equivalent of an open-file policy. 
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text it appears that the opinion applies to exculpatory evidence only. 
Moreover, Professor Cassidy may be overstating the significance of the 
opinion on the disclosure obligations of prosecutors. I have not seen 
anything to suggest that this bar opinion is related to earlier battles 
over the ethical rules on government subpoenas to lawyers and on 
secretly contacting a client’s lawyer. Indeed, the disclosure of evidence 
prior to plea is a much less controversial topic. 
CONCLUSION 
I concur with Professor Cassidy that constitutional and 
statutory rules of procedure are far better vehicles to regulate and 
guide prosecutors than ethics rules and opinions—especially when the 
ethics rules purport to provide guidance to prosecutors but are so 
unclear that they fail to do so. Given the vacuum created by the 
failure to enact statutory discovery reforms, the inappropriateness of 
regulation by ethics agencies, and the Ruiz decision, Professor Cassidy 
takes an understandably cautious approach to disclosure of 
impeachment information before a guilty plea. Because preplea 
disclosure presents special dangers and problems in terms of 
efficiency, witness safety, and victim privacy, he advocates as the most 
promising approach—either under Brady or as a general approach to 
preplea discovery—rulemaking by individual jurisdictions. The 
substance of these rules would require disclosure of specific categories 
of impeachment information and would provide time schedules for 
that disclosure.69 
These are all good suggestions. Professor Cassidy’s article 
provides added support for meaningful discovery reform, greater 
Brady compliance by prosecutors, and increased preplea disclosure of 
information supporting factual innocence. But in the end, I am still 
hesitant to adopt rules mandating preplea discovery of nonexculpatory 
material, even if disclosure is limited to specific categories of evidence. 
Given my own experience with the plea process, and having observed 
the process over the years, I continue to believe that—assuming they 
bargain honestly and in good faith—prosecutors should not be 
constrained in their ability to obtain pleas by categorical rules of 
discovery that could undermine the efficiency of the plea process and 




 69.  See Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1483–84.  
